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Sold Downstream: Free Speech, Fair Use, and  
Anti-Circumvention Law 
R. TERRY PARKER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Here’s a hypo.  Living in Asia, I purchased a shameful amount of mu-
sic and movies, all legit purchases through reputable stores, HMV and 
Tower Records, but little of which will get reissued.  I wanted to preserve 
my collection but software in the discs prevented me from ripping backup 
copies to my computer.  Lacking the technological savvy to get around this 
software myself, I purchased and used a product to help me circumvent 
these controls.  Discuss. 
Courts agree that copying the music and movies here is infringement 
but that fair use may provide a defense.  However, courts do not agree as to 
whether or not fair use provides a defense when determining the liability of 
selling products that enable me to access and copy my CDs to my com-
puter.  This article examines a line of cases in the Ninth Circuit that hold 
that fair use or lawfulness of copying is irrelevant in calculating liability 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and another line of 
cases in the Federal Circuit which hold that fair use should be relevant.  In 
particular, this article argues that calculating fair use into the analysis is 
crucial in maintaining the balance between the First Amendment’s protec-
tion of free speech rights and copyright’s regulation of speech. 
Part I will outline the relationship between free speech rights and copy-
rights, noting the important role that fair use plays in keeping this relation-
ship harmonious.  Part II will outline the anti-circumvention provisions in 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and argue that these broad brush 
provisions chill speech.  Part III will discuss two streams in the current 
law: first, the Ninth Circuit’s decisions 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn 
Mayer Studios, Inc.1 and Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. 
Divineo;2 and, second, the Federal Circuit’s decisions in The Chamberlain 
Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.3 and Storage Technology Corpo-
ration v. Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting, Inc.4  Part IV will 
  
 * J.D. Candidate, Franklin Pierce Law Center, Concord, N.H. 
 1. 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 2. 457 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 3. 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 4. 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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argue that the Federal Circuit’s approach to fair use is favored.  However, 
an alternate analysis toward their conclusion would have more constitu-
tional integrity.  Namely, the DMCA, as applied to software, should be 
seen as a content-based restriction on speech and should not be read to 
prohibit circumvention of access controls where the circumvention would 
not constitute a copyright violation. 
I.  FIRST AMENDMENT TENSION AND FAIR USE AS A SAFETY VALVE 
A. Free Speech 
On its face, the protection of copyrights poses a First Amendment co-
nundrum.  By granting monopolies in speech, copyright law confuses a 
plain reading of the free speech clause: “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”5  Although the 
wording “no law” is nowhere qualified by “ifs” or “buts” or “whereases,” 
as Justice Black states,6 the reality is that First Amendment jurisprudence 
is replete with “ifs” and “buts.”  The real question then is: after which of 
these “ifs” or “buts” does copyright seek cover? 
The type of First Amendment protection will depend upon which of 
the “ifs” or “buts” are at issue.  For example, the First Amendment offers 
its most robust protection to content-based speech, in other words, where 
the State is attempting to regulate speech because it expresses a certain 
viewpoint or deals with a certain subject matter.7  The Court views this 
abridgment with “strict scrutiny,” a presumptive violation of the Constitu-
tion.8  Protection here depends upon whether or not the State shows a com-
pelling state interest and whether or not the regulation is narrowly tailored 
to that interest.9  By narrowly tailored, the Court means the government’s 
means of accomplishing their goal must be the least restrictive means 
available.10  On the other hand, the First Amendment offers much less pro-
tection to content-neutral regulations—regulations which restrict the time, 
place, and manner of the speech.11  These regulations are constitutional if 
the regulation furthers a substantial government interest, if that interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restric-
tion on expression is no greater than what is necessary to further the state’s 
  
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 6. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 7. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).  
 10. Id. 
 11. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
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interest.12  This sort of regulation is less readily found invalid.  Moreover, 
the First Amendment offers even more limited protection to commercial 
speech—speech which proposes a commercial transaction.13  The Court 
views abridgments of this type of speech with intermediate scrutiny, the 
level of which varies within this category.14  As a further condition, the 
First Amendment offers no protection for speech that is incitement,15 fight-
ing words,16 or obscenity.17  Finally, the First Amendment will protect any 
type of speech if the regulation against it is too vague or broad—for exam-
ple, where protected speech might be swept up with the unprotected.18 
Thus, the constitutionality of copyright law depends very much upon 
the type of speech and, thus, the type of scrutiny that attaches. 
B. Free Speech Safety Valves 
Although academics have argued that copyright law should be subject 
to a harsher version of scrutiny,19 the U.S. Supreme Court shut the door on 
this issue.20  Eldred argued that the Copyright Terms Extension Act 
(CTEA) was a content-neutral regulation of speech that failed heightened 
judicial review under the First Amendment, reasoning the stricter version 
of intermediate scrutiny used in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Fed-
eral Communications Commission,21 was more appropriate.22  In Turner, 
cable operators had challenged the constitutionality of must-carry provi-
sions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992, which required them to broadcast local stations on their systems.23  
Despite the obvious favoritism for local broadcasters, the Court held the 
must-carry provisions did not indicate the State’s intent to distort the mar-
ketplace of ideas but a content-neutral response to the problems of a lim-
ited resource and the perceived economic vulnerability of the local broad-
  
 12. Id. at 376–77. 
 13. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980).  
 14. Id. at 566. 
 15. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 16. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 17. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 18. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 372 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 19. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 4–5 (2001).  However, as early as 1970, Melville Nimmer had countered this argument by 
positing that copyright law was spared First Amendment scrutiny because the law had built-in mecha-
nisms that honored the demands of the Constitution.  Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the 
First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970). 
 20. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
 21. 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994). 
 22. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218. 
 23. Turner, 512 U.S. at 626. 
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cast industry.24  Although content-neutral, the Court’s application of the 
O’Brien version of intermediate scrutiny contained far more oomph than 
what was normally used in content-neutral analysis.25 
Writing for the Court in Eldred, Justice Ginsburg dismissed the consti-
tutional challenge, arguing that both the First Amendment and the Copy-
right Clause were adopted close in time, a proximity which suggests the 
framers of the Constitution viewed copyright’s limited monopolies as 
compatible with free speech rights.26  Indeed, she argued, quite apart from 
chilling expression, the purpose of copyright is to promote the creation and 
publication of free expression.27  The Court reasoned copyright law con-
tains two built-in First Amendment accommodations: the idea/expression 
dichotomy and fair use.28  With the idea/expression dichotomy, protection 
extends only to expression, not ideas, so the free communication of ideas is 
not restricted but is made available to the public for exploitation.29  Like-
wise, fair use allows for the use of the actual expression of ideas in certain 
cases, affording latitude for scholarship and comment.30  Distinguishing 
Turner, the Court noted that, where the “must-carry” provisions implicated 
the core of the First Amendment—the principle that each person controls 
their expression, copyright does not force anyone to reproduce another’s 
speech against the carrier’s will.31  The Court then parsed fair use from the 
First Amendment, noting “the First Amendment securely protects the free-
dom to make—or decline to make—one’s own speech; it bears less heavily 
when speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.”32  The 
Court, however, did stop short of declaring copyright law “categorically 
immune from challenges under the First Amendment.”33 
 
  
 24. Id. at 655. 
 25. See id. at 664–65 (Here’s the oomph: “When the Government defends a regulation on speech as 
a means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply ‘posit the 
existence of the disease sought to be cured.’  It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not 
merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material 
way.” (citation omitted)). 
 26. 537 U.S. at 219. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 219–20. 
 29. Id. at 219. 
 30. Id. at 219–20. 
 31. Id. at 220–21. 
 32. Id. at 221. 
 33. Id. 
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II.  THE DMCA AND ITS FREE SPEECH CRITICS 
A. The Need for the DMCA 
Copyright law was clearly no match for the onslaught of personal 
computers, and less so the Internet.  In the 1980s, the law little deterred an 
individual who used his personal computer to make infringing copies of 
CDs, be it software or music, the quality of which was in no way dimin-
ished with each copy.  In the 1990s, the law had even less of a hold on an 
individual who could upload a copyrighted file to the Internet, in effect 
copying and distributing a dizzying amount of infringing copies all over 
the world within a single day.  The content industries fought back with 
technology to prevent copying and distribution, but hackers quickly coun-
tered with means to circumvent that technology. 
In response to this unprecedented scale of infringement, Congress en-
acted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998.  In addition 
to fighting infringement, the aim was to make “available quickly and con-
veniently via the Internet the movies, music, software, and literary works 
that are the fruit of American creative genius.”34  The DMCA was likewise 
in response to two World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) trea-
ties, which required the United States to offer protection to digitally trans-
mitted works by: (1) providing “legal remedies against the circumvention 
of technological measures designed to block access to copyrighted works; 
and (2) to prohibit the interference with copyright management informa-
tion digitally encoded in copyrighted works, including information about 
copyright ownership and licensing terms.”35  Title I of the DMCA adds 
Chapter 12 to the Copyright Act of 1976, but goes beyond the WIPO man-
dates in two respects: first by outlawing products that enable users to cir-
cumvent protection measures and second by laying down criminal penal-
ties for violators, in effect regulating conduct that previously fell outside 
the reach of copyright law.36 
B. The Anti-Circumvention Provisions in § 1201 
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) adds three new causes of action to copyright 
law.  Section 1201(a)(1)(A) prohibits circumvention of technological 
  
 34. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998).  See, e.g., Univ. City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 
435 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 35. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 391–92 (2005) (citing WIPO Copy-
right Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17 (1997); WIPO Performances and Phonogram 
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997)). 
 36. Id. at 392. 
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measures that control access.37  Section 1201(a)(2) prohibits the trafficking 
in devices that circumvent such measures.38  Section 1201(b) prohibits the 
trafficking in devices that aid in circumvention of copy-protection meas-
ures.39  These prohibitions can be categorized into two groups: those con-
cerning access control measures and those concerning use-control meas-
ures.  The provision restricting circumvention of use-control measures in § 
1201(b), unlike the restriction of access control measures in § 1201(a), 
prohibits the trafficking of the devices, but not the act of circumvention.40  
Copyright law already regulates this conduct and provides for exemptions 
and defenses which limit a copyright owner’s rights, for example, a fair use 
defense under § 107 which allows certain infringements on a copyright 
owner’s control of the use of his work.41  The distinction shields the preex-
isting rights of users under traditional copyright law from being undercut 
by the new legislation.42  Indeed, § 1201(c) expressly preserves these 
rights.43  
  
 37. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“No person shall circumvent a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”). 
 38. Id. § 1201(a)(2) (“No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise 
traffic in any technology . . . that—(A) is primarily designed . . . for the purpose of circumventing a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”). 
 39. Id. § 1201(b). 
Additional violations.—(1) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, pro-
vide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part 
thereof, that— 
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection af-
forded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright 
owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; 
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent 
protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a 
copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; or 
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that 
person’s knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a technological 
measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work 
or a portion thereof. 
(2) As used in this subsection— 
(A) to ‘circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure’ means avoiding, 
bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise impairing a technological measure; 
and 
(B) a technological measure ‘effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under 
this title’ if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or 
otherwise limits the exercise of a right of a copyright owner under this title. 
Id. 
 40. United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. § 1201(c) (“Other rights, etc., not affected.—(1) Nothing in this section shall affect rights, 
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title.  (2) 
Nothing in this section shall enlarge or diminish vicarious or contributory liability for copyright in-
fringement in connection with any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof.  (3) 
Nothing in this section shall require that the design of, or design and selection of parts and components 
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C. Critics Arguing These Broad Brushed Restrictions Chill Speech 
In 1999, Pamela Samuelson called for revision of the anti-
circumvention measures or judicial interpretation to narrow the scope of § 
1201.44  She argued that while the text and legislative history did show 
congressional intent to ensure consumers would continue to enjoy non-
infringing uses of copyrighted works—in particular for fair use, free 
speech, and free press purposes—the reality was that, in barring the traf-
ficking of circumvention products, those of us who are technologically 
challenged—thus unable to circumvent use-controls without the purchase 
of such products—are prohibited from circumventing use-control meas-
ures.45  As Anthony Reese argued, this merger of control measures under § 
1201(a) and § 1201(b) is more and more common in practice where, if 
accommodated by the courts, users’ ability to legally circumvent use-
control measures is seriously threatened, “[sucking] most of the oxygen out 
of Chapter 12’s breathing space for circumvention of rights-control meas-
ures for non-infringing purposes.”46  Moreover, there is the obvious con-
flict in the text, on the one hand outlawing technologies whose main pur-
pose is circumvention of use-control measures while on the other hand 
recognizing the lawfulness of fair-use type circumventions.47  This contra-
diction does beg the question: whether or not Congress has made an empty 
promise of fair use and has thus, if we recall the safety valve role as pos-
ited in Eldred,48 skewed the balance between First Amendment and copy-
right law.49 
Two current pieces of legislation are pending in an alleged attempt to 
right the balance between protecting copyright owners’ right to guard ac-
cess to their works and protecting a consumer’s lawful use of works.  The 
Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act would allow for circumvention and 
trafficking in circumvention products where such products were protected 
  
for, a consumer electronics, telecommunications, or computing product provide for a response to any 
particular technological measure, so long as such part or component, or the product in which such part 
or component is integrated, does not otherwise fall within the prohibitions of subsection (a)(2) or 
(b)(1).  (4) Nothing in this section shall enlarge or diminish any rights of free speech or the press for 
activities using consumer electronics, telecommunications, or computing products.”). 
 44. Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention 
Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 524 (1999). 
 45. Id. at 546–48. 
 46. R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the Structure 
of the Anticircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619, 650–51 (2003). 
 47. Samuelson, supra note 44, at 557. 
 48. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 49. Id. 
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by a fair use defense.50  It has not met much success—re-introduced into 
Congress three times and more recently rejected because Congress prefers 
not to use legislation as a means of addressing fair use.51  The Benefit Au-
thors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations Act of 
2003 comes with less bravado, but there has been no action on this bill 
since its referral to the House Committee on the Judiciary in March of 
2003.52 
If fair use is to function as a First Amendment safety valve within cop-
yright law, the DMCA needs to be interpreted in a manner that gives fair 
use room to breath.  The next section outlines the circuit split on free 
speech and fair use in the context of anti-circumvention law. 
III.  CASE LAW 
Courts consistently deny free speech challenges to the DMCA.  How-
ever, anti-circumvention law seems to diverge into two currents when ad-
dressing what constitutes permissible circumvention and trafficking in cir-
cumvention devices and what does not.  The Northern District of Califor-
nia and the Southern District of New York flow in one direction and the 
Federal Circuit and the Sixth Circuit in another.  This part of the article 
will outline the opinions of the courts in 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn 
Mayer Studios, Inc.53 and Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. 
Divineo54 on the one hand and the opinion of the Federal Circuit in The 
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.55 and Storage 
Technology Corporation v. Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting, 
Inc. 56 on the other. 
  
 50. Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2005 (DMCRA), H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. § 5(b) 
(2005). 
 51. Alison R. Watkins, Surgical Safe Harbors: The Family Movie Act and the Future of Fair Use 
Legislation, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 241, 262 (2006). 
 52. Benefit Authors Without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations Act of 2003 
(BALANCE), H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 53. 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 54. 457 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 55. 381 F.3d. 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 56. 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  See also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 
Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004) (providing an example of the courts taking a more expansive reading 
of fair use defense in the § 1201 context). 
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A. Restrictive Views of Fair Use 
1. 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc.57 
The plaintiff, 321 Studios, was a small Internet company that marketed 
and sold an instruction manual and software that aided customers in mak-
ing backup copies of DVDs.58  The business was purportedly aimed at le-
gitimate copying and sought a declaratory judgment stating it did not vio-
late § 1201(a)(2) and § 1201(b)(1) of the DMCA.59  321 Studios also chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the DMCA—that it restricted 321 Studio’s 
First Amendment free speech rights under the First Amendment and vio-
lated the First Amendment by skirting the fair use defense.60 
The court prefaced its opinion with a lengthy discussion of the persua-
siveness of three precedents, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,61 
which reached the appellate level as Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Corley,62 and finally United States v. Elcom Ltd.63  In Corley, where Eric 
Corley was enjoined from publishing the decryption software DeCSS, the 
court found a First Amendment challenge to the DMCA did not survive.64  
The court held that, although computer code was speech, code should be 
divided into communicative and functional speech.65  The speech at issue 
was functional and as such was more conduct than message.66  Aimed at 
conduct, the regulation attracted intermediate scrutiny.67  Under intermedi-
ate scrutiny an injunction was not an unreasonable burden on speech.68  
Moreover, the court held the DMCA did not unconstitutionally limit fair 
use.69  Similarly, in Elcom, where a computer programmer was arrested for 
publishing a program that allowed users to remove restrictions on Adobe’s 
eBook Reader, the defendant argued the DMCA was unconstitutionally 
vague and that the DMCA was a content-based restriction which violated 
the First Amendment because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a com-
pelling government interest.70  Furthermore, according to the defendant, 
  
 57. 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. 
 58. Id. at 1089. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 62. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 63. 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 64. 111 F. Supp. 2d at 303. 
 65. Id. at 328–29. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 329–30. 
 68. Id. at 330–33. 
 69. 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1092–93 (N.D. Cal. 
2004) (citing Univ. City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 70. 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1127–31 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
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the DMCA infringed the fair use rights of third parties, thus chilling free 
expression.71  The Elcom court rejected each of these arguments.72 
a. Did 321 Studios Sell a Product Regulated by § 1201? 
321 Studios argued that their product did not meet the definition of cir-
cumventing a technological measure set in § 1201(a)(2)—which limits 
regulation to circumvention without the copyright owner’s authority—
because their product only worked on original DVDs and the purchaser of 
an original has authority to access that DVD.73  The court followed the 
precedent set in Corley, where the same argument had been offered, and 
found that a purchaser of an original has the authority to view but not to 
decrypt.74  Next, the plaintiff argued § 1201(b)(1)75 did not apply because 
that section concerned illegal copying, whereas 321’s software circum-
vented CSS, which concerned access, not copying.76  The court acknowl-
edged this was technically true, but merged the two concepts of access and 
use-control, arguing the purpose of preventing access was to prevent copy-
ing.77  Although the primary use was lawful, the court noted that the lawful 
use of the software was not regulated by the statute, which merely regu-
lated the unlawful trafficking of devices that facilitated lawful or unlawful 
use.78 
b. Other First Amendment Violations? 
321 Studios argued the DMCA violated the First Amendment in sev-
eral ways.79  First, it argued that by preventing legitimate downstream use 
of copyrighted material, the DMCA violates the First Amendment rights of 
  
 71. Id. at 1122. 
 72. Id. at 1134–35. 
 73. 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1096. 
 74. Id. 
 75. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1) (2006) (“No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, pro-
vide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that—
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection afforded by a tech-
nological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a 
portion thereof; (B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent 
protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner 
under this title in a work or a portion thereof; or (C) is marketed by that person or another acting in 
concert with that person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a 
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or 
a portion thereof.”). 
 76. 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1096–97. 
 77. Id. at 1097. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 1099. 
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its users.80  Second, it argued the law unconstitutionally restricted 321’s 
speech because it is an overbroad regulation.81  Relying on Corley and El-
com, the court held that, while code is speech, this is not a content-based 
distinction because the law is aimed at functional speech in the code, not 
the communicative speech.82  As a content-neutral restriction, the law sur-
vives the intermediate scrutiny test set forth in Turner, because the gov-
ernment interest was unrelated to the suppression of free speech, and the 
incidental restrictions on speech are no greater than what is essential to 
further that interest.83  Likewise, the court found that the statute did not 
pose impermissible burdens on the fair use rights of users.84  The court 
rejected the claim that users have a First Amendment right to fair use of the 
works.85 
2. Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. Divineo86 
Divineo marketed and sold anti-circumvention devices, an HDLoader, 
“mod chips,” and other devices which allowed users of Sony’s PlayStation 
to play from alternate drives, to play homemade games, or other games, 
either original games or illegally copied.87  Divineo described its product 
as chips sold to customers who wanted to modify their video game con-
soles to make them as similar to a computer as possible.88  The HDLoader 
allowed users to load and run Sony games faster from a hard drive that has 
been connected to the PlayStation.89  Although Divineo does not provide 
instructions, the mod chips may be configured by consumers to allow a 
copied game to be played.90 
Sony argued that selling these products was in violation of § 
1201(a)(1) and § 1201(b)(1), specifically that Divineo manufactured and 
  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1100–01 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 624 (1994)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1101 (“‘[T]he First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—or decline to 
make—one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s 
speeches.  To the extent such assertions raise First Amendment concerns, copyright’s built-in free 
speech safeguards are generally adequate to address them.’ . . . While . . . not immune from challenges 
under the First Amendment, it is a stretch to claim that Eldred mandated absolute First Amendment 
protection for fair use of copyrighted works.” (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003))). 
 86. 457 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 87. Id. at 959.  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HD_Loader (describing an HD loader); http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Mod_Chip (describing modchips). 
 88. Sony, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 959. 
 89. Defendant Frederic Legault’s Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at ¶ 35, Sony, 457 
F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (No. 4:04-cv-042000-CW). 
 90. Id. ¶ 36. 
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trafficked in a product whose primary and sole function was to circumvent 
Sony’s access control, and that they trafficked in devices primarily de-
signed to circumvent use-control measures.91  Divineo argued that the 
products at issue may be used in a way that did not involve accessing cop-
ies of Sony’s copyrighted work or in a way that merely makes fair use of 
them.92  For example, the mod chips provide interoperability of independ-
ently created programs.  Similarly, a mod chip may be the only way to play 
games that are purchased legally but imported into the United States. 
The court followed the precedent set in 321 Studios and Elcom, assert-
ing that downstream fair use of circumvention devices is not a defense 
under the DMCA.93  According to the DMCA, the use of such devices is 
still lawful but the trafficking is not.94  That one must be technologically 
sophisticated in order to make fair use of lawfully purchased games is not 
evidence that the purpose of the mod chip is lawful.95 
 
B. Cases Accommodating Downstream Fair Use as a Defense to the 
DMCA 
1. Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.96 
The plaintiff, Chamberlain, manufactured garage door openers.97  Their 
system consisted of a hand-held transmitter and an opening device in the 
homeowner’s garage, whereby the hand-held transmitter sends a signal to 
the opening device, which then opens the door.98  Chamberlain employed a 
rolling code as a signal to prevent other transmitters from opening the 
door.99  The defendant, Skylink, manufactured a hand held transmitter that 
operated the Chamberlain motor by circumventing the rolling code.100  
Chamberlain sued, alleging both patent infringement and violations of the 
DMCA, but lost at both the trial and the appellate court level.101 
 
  
 91. Sony, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 959. 
 92. Id. at 965 
 93. Id. at 965–66. 
 94. Id. at 964. 
 95. Id. at 965. 
 96. 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 97. Id. at 1183. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 1203–04. 
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a. Sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1) 
Chamberlain complained that Skylink violated § 1201(a)(2), which 
provides liability where a person traffics in a device designed to circum-
vent, without the authority of the copyright owner, access control meas-
ures.102  Chamberlain cited Corley and 321 Studios as precedent, showing 
that the authority granted to the consumer did not extend to the traf-
ficker.103 
However, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that § 
1201(a)(2) applied only where a technological measure was circumvented 
without the authority of the copyright owner, and, because Skylink did 
have authority, found in favor of Skylink.104  Chamberlain had implicitly 
given authority because a homeowner, who buys the Chamberlain product, 
owns it and has a right to use it.105  Had they not authorized use, they could 
have set explicit terms and conditions upon the purchase, restricting use.106  
According to the court, to read the DMCA as Chamberlain had would 
grant an additional property right, as opposed to another cause of action, 
which could not have been the intention of the Corley court.107  Such a 
reading, in the eyes of the court, would have unreasonable policy implica-
tions, effectually granting broad immunities to both antitrust and copyright 
laws.108  Therefore, the court held that § 1201 “prohibits only forms of 
access that bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copy-
right Act otherwise affords copyright owners.”109  That is, liability for cir-
cumventing access control measures extends only to where there is reason-
able potential of infringement.110 
  
 102. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000) (“No person shall manufac-
ture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, de-
vice, component, or part thereof, that—(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of cir-
cumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; 
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; or (C) is marketed by that 
person or another acting in concert with that person with that person's knowledge for use in circum-
venting a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”). 
 103. Plaintiff-Appellant’s Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and for Rehearing en banc at 11, 
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1118).  
 104. Chamberlain, 381 F. 3d at 1203–04. 
 105. Id. at 1187. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1193. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. at 1202–03. 
 110. Id. 
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The court also grounded its conclusion in the structure and legislative 
history of the DMCA.111  The structure of the Act, according to the court, 
makes it clear that § 1201 only applies to circumventions reasonably re-
lated to protected rights.112  For example, the Act sets three provisions tar-
geted at the circumvention of technological protections: § 1201(a)(1) pre-
venting circumvention of access controls, § 1201(a)(2) preventing traffick-
ing in products that circumvent access controls, and § 1201(b)(1) prevent-
ing trafficking in devices that circumvent use-controls.113  The Act omits 
liability for circumventing use-control measures because there were long-
standing provisions elsewhere that controlled use.114  The other provisions 
filled needs created by the digital challenge, but did not create a new form 
of infringement.115  Furthermore, because § 1201(c) provides that “nothing 
in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copy-
right infringement, including fair use, under this title,” allowing § 1201(a) 
to prohibit access without regard to these rights would be illogical.  The 
legislative history emphasizes the need to balance the rights of users with 
the rights of content creators, but to find liability for circumvention of ac-
cess where protection of rights was not an issue would greatly askew this 
balance.116  The court also noted that the Second Circuit cases upon which 
Chamberlain relies all include this nexus between access and rights pro-
tected by copyright. 
C. Storage Technology Corp. v. Custom Hardware Engineering & Consult-
ing, Inc.117 
StorageTek (STK) manufactured and sold computer tape storage drives 
with a follow up maintenance service.118  A maintenance code was pre-
loaded on the systems, booting up onto the RAM when the machines were 
turned on, but a license provided that consumers acquired no rights to use 
it.119  A password scheme, called GetKey, protected the maintenance code 
and the maintenance data.120  Custom Hardware Engineering (CHE) pro-
  
 111. Id. at 1194–95 (implying that Corley might be distinguished because it needed to limit its query 
to Constitutional issues and did not need to consider the full boundaries set by the overall structure of 
the DMCA). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1194–95. 
 114. Id. at 1195. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1196–97. 
 117. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware & Eng’g Consulting, Inc. (Storage Tech III), No. 02-
12102-RWZ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43690 (D. Mass. June 28, 2006). 
 118. Id. at *2. 
 119. Id. at *3. 
 120. Id.  
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vided a rival maintenance service.121  In order to access the maintenance 
information, they circumvented the password protocol.122  In 2002, STK 
sued alleging, inter alia: (1) CHE infringed their software since by booting 
up to access the information they copied the software in the RAM, and (2) 
a violation of the DMCA because STK circumvented an access protection 
measure.123  CHE counter-claimed with allegations of antitrust and state 
law violations.124  In 2003, the district court granted a preliminary injunc-
tion against CHE in Storage Tech I.125  The case reached the Federal Cir-
cuit in 2005, where the court vacated the preliminary injunction and re-
manded the case, finding that CHE was likely to prevail.126 
On the infringement issue, a divided panel noted that § 117(c) pro-
vided a defense where infringement is made “solely by virtue of activation 
of a machine . . . for purposes only of maintenance or repair of that ma-
chine” and that CHE’s infringement fell within this defense.127  Likewise, 
the Federal Circuit found an implied license permitted the purchasers to 
load the code as well, despite contractual language excluding use of the 
maintenance code.128  The court reasoned that the copying happened as a 
result of activating the machine and that CHE had authority to activate the 
machines.129  The customers could not activate the machine without copy-
ing the code.130  Absent wording preventing them from activating the ma-
chines, they had an implied license to copy the code, and this implied li-
cense extended to CHE, who was acting as an agent for the customer.131  
On the circumvention issue, the court followed Chamberlain, finding it 
likely that STK would lose on this issue because circumventing access 
control measures violates § 1201 only when infringing or facilitating in-
fringement of a right protected by the Copyright Act.132  Where the copy-
ing is protected by the § 117(c) defense, circumvention is not liable.133  
The court reasoned that the DMCA must be read in the context of the Cop-
yright Act, balancing the rights of the copyright owner with the rights of 
  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at *4. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at *4–5. 
 126. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware & Eng’g Consulting, Inc. (Storage Tech II), 421 F.3d 
1307, 1309–11 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
 127. Id. at 1311–15 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2000)).  
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1315–16. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1319. 
 133. Id. at 1317.   
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the consumer to access and use the work.134  CHE’s alleged infringement 
aside, the court held that liability for circumvention depends upon whether 
or not a “sufficient nexus” exists between the rights protected by copyright 
law and the circumvention.135 
On remand, the district court found that the loading and use of the 
maintenance software did not consist of copyright infringement or a viola-
tion of the DMCA’s anti-circumvention measures.136  The court considered 
three allegedly infringing copies of the maintenance software: reverse.exe, 
Run Time Diagnostics, and English translations of FSCs.137  Each of these 
infringement claims failed on technicalities.138  First, the previous allega-
tion concerned copying of the maintenance code, but on the facts, the re-
verse.exe was not maintenance code.139  Throughout the litigation, the 
maintenance code was defined as having three defining features: it locates, 
diagnoses, and analyzes equipment malfunctions; it is enabled by or dis-
abled by the GetKey; and it includes any portion of the code supporting 
maintenance function.140  These features did not apply to reverse.exe.  Sec-
ondly, the Run Time Diagnostics and the FSC’s were a portion of the 
maintenance code, but because STK had strategically confined its in-
fringement claim to “Maintenance Code in its entirety,” which limited 
CHE's discovery, STK was not allowed to pursue a claim based on pre-
cisely the elements of the Maintenance Code that it refused to disclose in 
discovery.141  The court found that Storage Tech was asserting a new 
claim.  Regarding the DMCA violation, STK, acknowledging the Federal 
Circuit opinion and frustrated with its pursuit of these claims, was willing 
to withdraw its claims if CHE agreed not to seek attorney’s fees.142  CHE, 
however, refused to relinquish, leading the court to consider the issue.143  
STK then asserted that its DMCA claim was based on circumvention of 
GetKey to access and copy the Run Time Diagnostics.144  Circumvention is 
actionable to the extent that it infringes or facilitates infringement in a right 
protected by the Copyright Act.145  Customers can access Run Time Diag-
  
 134. Id. at 1318. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware & Eng’g Consulting, Inc. (Storage Tech III), No. 02-
12102-RWZ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43690, at *22 (D. Mass. June 28, 2006). 
 137. Id. at *11. 
 138. Id. at *21. 
 139. Id. at *13–15. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.    
 143. Id. at *15–19. 
 144. Id. at *23. 
 145. Id. at *24. 
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nostics without violating the Copyright Act because it is available on the 
hard drive or the disks that STK ships with its products.146 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A. Problems with the Free Speech Analysis in 321 Studios 
With the 321 Studios decision following Corley and Elcom, the DMCA 
looks firmly entrenched against a First Amendment challenge.  Unfortu-
nately, the free speech analysis from these cases is unconvincing.  The 
trouble is in the court’s approach in determining the type of speech when 
analyzing the regulation as applied.147  In equating computer code with 
“conduct,” the court moved with some quick hands. 
First, the court in 321 Studios agreed that computer code is speech 
within the reach of First Amendment protection, a point upon which the 
case law is well settled.148  As explained in Corley, the law provides 
speech-wide avenues where First Amendment protection is concerned, 
letting past speech devoid of political relevance, artistic expression, and 
accommodating speech of controversial use—for example, the instructions 
for dangerous sex acts.149  The court in 321 Studios then noted the level of 
scrutiny depends upon whether or not the regulation is aimed at the content 
of the speech, an equally well-settled point.150  Here 321 Studios argued 
that the DMCA is aimed at the content of the speech.151  This seems sensi-
ble.  A content-based restriction is one aimed at either the subject matter or 
the viewpoint of the speech.152  The code prohibited here, DeCSS, is tar-
geted because of its subject matter, circumvention.  However, having de-
termined that code is speech, the court seems to detour from the usual First 
Amendment analysis by arguing this particular speech does not count be-
cause it is functional, as opposed to communicative.153  According to the 
court, the code here produces a result, the circumvention of CSS, and as 
  
 146. Id. at *25. 
 147. Again, distinguishing between content-based and content-neutral regulation of speech is crucial 
in First Amendment analysis because a law deemed content-based triggers strict scrutiny, a test that 
few laws survive.  See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (“[W]e presume 
that government regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of 
ideas than to encourage it.  The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society 
outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.”). 
 148. 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 
2004). 
 149. Univ. City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 150. 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1101. 
 151. Id. at 1100. 
 152. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980). 
 153. 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d 1099–1100. 
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such should be treated as conduct.154  Conduct, as opposed to speech, at-
tracts far less First Amendment protection.155  However, this “yeah, but” 
flow in the analysis is troubling.   
As the defendant argued in Elcom, all computer code is by nature func-
tional.156  For example, according to the Copyright Act, “a ‘computer pro-
gram’ is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly 
in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.”157  Programs that do 
not function, flop.  In this sense, the function and the expression are inex-
tricably tied.  The court refutes this by citing Justice Whyte who, in Elcom, 
noted that the courts regularly parse out the functional from the expressive 
in copyright law, for example, in infringement issues.158 
The trouble is that functionality is more intractable than the court lets 
on.  An early example is Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. 
where, as a defense to infringing an operating system, Franklin argued 
copyright protection did not extend to the object code because it was essen-
tially functional, but the court held that if protection extended to software it 
had to extend to both the source code and the object code.159  The two 
could not be “kenneled” from each other.160 
Elcom is correct in that courts do parse function from expression in 
software, but this is not copyright at its most graceful.  For example, in 
Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., the court at-
tempted to separate the idea from expression in a computer program, defin-
ing the program’s idea as its function or ultimate purpose.161  The result 
was wide protection for software because the function was limited to its 
ultimate purpose.  However, in Computer Associates v. Altai Inc., the court 
chose not to define the functional elements of the code as merely the ulti-
mate purpose, but found functional elements entwined, which made for 
some awkward parsing.162  The court posited a test for separating the idea 
from the expression, abstracting the program into its various levels of gen-
erality, its ultimate function on the one hand and its detailed code on the 
other.163  The elements dictated by efficiency or taken from the public do-
main are filtered out to not receive protection, and the remainder is com-
  
 154. Id. at 1100. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. (citing United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2002)). 
 157. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 158. 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 (quoting United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 
1111, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2002)). 
 159. 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 160. Id. 
 161. 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 526 F. 
Supp. 75, 783 (C.D. Cal. 1983).  
 162. 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 163. Id. at 706–07. 
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pared with the corresponding elements in the offending work.164  This test 
narrows the scope of protection.  However, applying this to First Amend-
ment analysis would presumably result in more constitutional protection of 
DeCSS.  Elcom, and by extension 321 Studios, employed neither test, but 
concluded code is conduct because it leads to a functional end result. 
This might be a preferred way of treating software but it is not in sync 
with the earlier part of the analysis, which takes a more expansive view of 
when code is speech.  Given how little in software is really expressive in 
the way a book on how to circumvent access and copyright control meas-
ures is expressive, there is a good argument that code is not speech at all.  
The test should focus on the end result: whether the regulation is one of 
something really “speech-y,” like a game with a narrative and other speech 
properties or one of something not very “speech-y” at all, like a program 
that facilitates transactions in a bank, or the opening of a garage door.165  
The approach in Elcom hints at this, but in a contradictory manner. 
Raymond Nimmer would likely argue that this separating of functional 
from expressive in DeCSS may not have been necessary in order to avoid 
strict scrutiny.166  Given that the expressive elements are intertwined with 
the functional, intermediate scrutiny might still apply because the regula-
tion is ultimately aimed at conduct and should be analyzed according to 
United States v. O’Brien.167  There, the defendant destroyed his draft card 
on the steps of the South Boston Court house in front of a small crowd, in 
violation of a regulation prohibiting such conduct.168  His defense was that 
his conduct was expression.169  The Court held: 
[W]hen “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined in 
the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important govern-
mental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify 
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. . . . [A] 
government is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitu-
tional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or 
substantial government interest; if the government interest is 
  
 164. Id. at 707–11. 
 165. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 121–23 (2000) (arguing that computer 
software is not expressive but should be viewed as a machine itself, removing it from First Amendment 
analysis all together).  
 166. See, e.g., RAYMOND T. NIMMER, FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH AND THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM 
COPYRIGHT ACT: A PROPER MARRIAGE, IN COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH—COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES 27–29 (Johnathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersaner eds., 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=572886 (arguing the DMCA targets conduct be-
cause the aim of the code is not expressive speech but conduct). 
 167. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
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unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the inci-
dental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.170 
321 Studios applied intermediate scrutiny, citing Turner, but without 
Turner’s oomph, as if applying O’Brien.171  Applying O’Brien, we see the 
government is sufficiently justified as set out in the Constitution.172  The 
interest in incentivizing speech is substantial.  This interest is unrelated to 
the suppression of free expression, indeed just the opposite.173  The restric-
tion on marketing this software is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest.  Thus, if the DMCA regulates a mix of conduct and 
expressive speech, the argument goes, the regulation would survive 
O’Brien scrutiny. 
As in Elcom, this is an uneasy assumption.  To assume this is a regula-
tion of conduct just because the speech has both functional and expressive 
elements is flawed.  For example, to say that speech has functional ele-
ments does not mean the expressive elements somehow disappear.  The 
expression is still there, or there would be no functional element.  Further-
more, to say that speech is conduct because the speech leads to an inevita-
ble function confuses the result with the instructions, the cake with the 
recipe.  If the code is communication from which the machine produces a 
result, circumvention, to regulate the result, circumvention, is a regulation 
of conduct.  However, to regulate the communication that leads to that 
conduct is a regulation of speech—a content based regulation of speech. 
An alternative argument for finding the DMCA lawful as applied in 
321 Studios or Elcom would be the incitement argument.  For example, 
because circumvention is illegal, the regulation of speech inciting circum-
vention might be seen as constitutional.  The constitutional guarantees of 
free speech do not prevent regulation of speech where the “advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action.”174  Lack of imminence is the usual hang-up 
for demonstrating a regulation is constitutional on incitement grounds.  
That would not be a problem here if they show the code immediately ef-
fects the circumvention when it is implemented by the machine.  On this 
point, it appears that § 1201, as applied in 321 Studios, would survive an as 
applied First Amendment challenge.  However, liability might also hinge 
on whether or not the speech led to imminent lawless action at the time it 
  
 170. Id. 
 171. 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 
2004). 
 172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 173. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
 174. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1989). 
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was “uttered.”  I suspect this hinge veered the court from opting for the 
incitement door. 
Rather than viewing the code as conduct or unprotected speech, the 
court should have acknowledged this is a content-based regulation but—
because of copyright law’s unique constitutional status—a regulation that 
would have survived strict scrutiny.  The precedent for this is Burson v. 
Freeman.175  In that case, a Tennessee statute prohibited campaign speech 
within one hundred feet of the polling place.176  This regulation had three 
strikes against it: (1) a curb on political speech (2) in a public forum (3) 
that was content based—all earmarks for VIP protection in First Amend-
ment law.177  Nevertheless, the regulation was constitutional since this was 
a rare case where the regulation was aimed at protecting a fundamental 
constitutional right.178  To analogize, the DMCA, as applied in 321 Studios, 
is a content-based regulation but should be seen as constitutional because it 
is narrowly tailored to protect a fundamental right guaranteed in the Con-
stitution—i.e., the protection of copyrights. 
To conclude this point, the DMCA should be seen as a content-based 
regulation of speech when applied to code.  This is nonetheless a constitu-
tional regulation because copyright law protects a right guaranteed by the 
Constitution.  This is an acceptable paradox, if we borrow the argument 
from Eldred and Harpers, because copyright law, far from restricting 
speech on the whole, is an engine of free expression, and the doctrine of 
fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy keep this regulation from chill-
ing too much speech. 
Unfortunately, fair use has not been given sufficient room in some cir-
cuits, undermining this balance. 
B. Fair Use Should be Considered in the DMCA Calculus 
The 321 Studios opinion, as well as Corley, Elcom, and Davineo, mis-
takenly demeaned the role of fair use in their analysis, resulting in a sweep-
ing new right for copyright owners.  This is problematic from a constitu-
tional perspective because a content-based regulation of speech must be 
narrowly tailored to its goal, the goal here being the protection of copy-
rights.  When the DMCA is used not to protect copyrights, but to protect 
the aftermarket of goods, the regulation operates beyond its aim and is thus 
unconstitutional. 
  
 175. 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
 176. Id. at 193–194. 
 177. Id. at 196. 
 178. Id. at 210. 
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First, not factoring fair use into the analysis is out of sync with the 
WIPO treaties.179  The treaties’ requirements see anti-circumvention law as 
existing within the context of copyright law, not separate from it.180  For 
example, they require protection and remedies against the circumvention of 
technological measures, but qualify those measures as those “in connection 
with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention 
and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized by 
the authors concerned or permitted by law.”181  Not allowing downstream 
fair use to play into the anti-circumvention analysis takes copyright law 
beyond those parameters.  Although this is allowed, given that the treaties 
set forth minimum standards, doing so does cause problems as mentioned 
above. 
Unlike the scenario before the courts in Corley and Elcom, the prod-
ucts at issue in 321 Studios and Divineo had a predominantly lawful pur-
pose and, as such, fair use should have been factored into the analysis, not 
dismissed.  For example, in 321 Studios, the product served customers who 
wanted to back up their DVDs.182  In Divineo, the product allowed custom-
ers to play from a more efficient disk as well as to play altered games.183  
The court there dismissed this element, reasoning that fair use is still avail-
able.184  For example, the DMCA does not prevent the owner from pointing 
his camcorder at his television and copying the movie.  According to Cor-
ley: 
We know of no authority for the proposition that fair use, as pro-
tected by the Copyright Act, much less the Constitution, guaran-
tees copying by the optimum method or in the identical format of 
the original. . . . The fact that the resulting copy will not be as per-
fect or as manipulable as a digital copy obtained by having direct 
access to the DVD movie in its digital form, provides no basis for 
a claim of unconstitutional limitation of fair use.185 
This is true if we take a narrow reading of § 1201.  For example, § 1201(b) 
prohibits trafficking in the devices and § 1201(c) ensures that the DMCA is 
  
 179. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17 (1997); WIPO Perform-
ances and Phonogram Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997). 
 180. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17 (1997); WIPO Perform-
ances and Phonogram Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997). 
 181. WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/ 
wct/trtdocs_wo033.html. 
 182. 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 
2004). 
 183. Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Divineo, 457 F. Supp. 2d 957, 959 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 184. Id. at 965–66; 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1101. 
 185. 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1101–02 (quoting Univ. City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 
429, 459 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
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not read to prohibit fair use.  Other means of fair use are not, in theory, 
prohibited. 
As the Federal Circuit noted, a problem with this reading is that if we 
allow prohibitions on access controls to sweep up use-controls, this creates 
a new copyright, a new form of property, radically altering the landscape 
of the previous law.186  For example, such a reading would allow for con-
tent owners to control the aftermarket of goods.  This is not a sensible re-
sult.  The Federal Circuit’s contextual reading recognizes that removing 
fair use as a defense conflicts with the policy of copyright law in general 
and of the DMCA in particular.  The policy of copyright law is to encour-
age, not smother, innovation.187  The policy of the DMCA is to “ensure a 
thriving electronic marketplace for copyrighted works on the Internet.”188  
This is achieved by striking a balance between the copyright owner and the 
consumer which lies at the heart of intellectual property law.  For example, 
the copyright clause is ultimately a utilitarian construct, balancing the pro-
tections offered to the copyright owner with the benefit to the public.  The 
sweeping right set out above by the Second Circuit upsets this balance. 
However, judicial arguments anchored on policy are easily unmoored.  
Here, the copyright owners will argue a broader role of fair use in § 1201 
tips the balance too far in the wrong direction.  The fear is that courts will 
open the door to rampant infringement.  This will depend upon how far 
downstream the fair use has to be before it is not a factor.  Although the 
expansive reading of fair use does open the door for uncertainty, the Fed-
eral Circuit cases here suggest little tolerance for infringement.189  In 
Chamberlain and Storage Tech, the downstream use at issue was lawful.  
The Federal Circuit’s reading would not restrict the DMCA in its applica-
tion in Remeirdes or Corley.  The court made much of Corley’s proclaimed 
intent to infringe in distinguishing that case.190  Whether or not their read-
ing would have provided protection for 321 Studios or Divineo is less 
clear.  In each, although substantial fair use did appear downstream, so did 
the potential for unlawful copying.  For example, a lawful owner of a DVD 
could make thousands of copies and sell them.  These will be issues to be 
decided on a case by case basis, demarcating over time the contours of 
what is allowed and what is not.  Deciding where these boundaries lie is no 
easy task, given the vagaries of fair use jurisprudence. 
  
 186. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d. 1178, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 188. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 9 (1998) (as cited in David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative His-
tory: The Sweet and Sour Spots of the DMCA’s Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 916 (2002)).   
 189. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1187 (emphasizing Corley’s unlawful intent). 
 190. Id. 
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Although the policy of allowing copyright law to reach beyond its 
normal aim might well be unsound, the real problem is that such an appli-
cation of the DMCA is simply unlawful.  If we do not consider whether or 
not a use falls under the fair use defense and then allow the DMCA to 
regulate beyond its tailored aim, such a regulation is not constitutional.  
The DMCA, as argued above, is a content-based regulation of speech.  A 
content-based regulation of speech is constitutional only so far as it is nar-
rowly tailored to its aim.  Where the DMCA is used to protect copyrights, 
the regulation is lawful.  Where it prohibits what copyright law would oth-
erwise find lawful, the DMCA is unlawful. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The use of the First Amendment as a defense is of limited help in 
DMCA litigation, failing because the DMCA is seen as a content-neutral 
regulation attracting intermediate scrutiny.  As discussed above, this analy-
sis, as posited in Corley, Elcom, and 321 Studios, is suspect.  This article 
has argued the DMCA should be seen as a content-based regulation of 
speech where it regulates computer code that causes the circumvention.  
Although content-based regulations are typically unlawful, the DMCA 
should be seen as a constitutional as long as the law is applied to protect 
copyrights.  However, lawfulness depends upon considering fair use as a 
defense in DMCA violations.  As the Federal Circuit has recognized, if we 
do not consider downstream fair use in anti-circumvention law, the DMCA 
creates property rights that did not otherwise exists.  This is not the aim of 
the legislation.  More troubling, if we do not factor fair use into our analy-
sis, we allow the DMCA to possibly regulate beyond the reach of copy-
right law.  Where the DMCA regulates speech that does not violate copy-
right law, the regulation is unconstitutional. 
The worry in striking the DMCA as unconstitutional is understandable.  
After all, copyright is an engine of free expression.  However, this worry 
should not cause us to dismiss with our normal free speech analysis. 
